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PREFACE

I have spent a good deal of my working life in such
occupations as ditch-digger and I have found grcss
misunderstanding of philosophy by my colleagues in such
fields.

This has not surprised me.

However, I am also

well acquainted with many persons of good breeding,
background, and education who also misrepresent philosophy
Philosophy is often considered obtuse and

to themselves.
impractical.

Occasionally it can be both of these, but it

is not usually either of them.
I hope that the present work falls in with the usual
lot, and not with the occasional lot.

Indeed, I have

intentionally tried to adopt a style which is at once
clear, rigorous, and common.

The inadequacy of the

background most college graduates have in philosophy is
tragic, but not nearly as tragic as the fact that it is so
ill understood.

In this respect I would rather be charged

with the commission of a fallacy than that of obscurity.
Philosophy in its present state is an exciting field
to be in because so many critical questions are being
raised in so many different areas.

The physician in 1980

finds himself confronted with ethical questions with which
his counterpart in 1880 would never have had to consider.
Questions in political philosophy assume new significance

iii
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in a world of superpowers and nuclear arms.

So too with

science, not since Newton have scientists and philosophers
had so much in common to discuss.
Perhaps though, the most dynamic area of philosophy at
present is the philosophy of language.

Certainly no other

area of philosophy is as critical to philosophy itself, for
language is the laboratory of philosophers.

Further, the

problem of meaning is as critical to the philosophy of
language as the philosophy of language is to philosophy.
For this reason I have chosen the problem of meaning as the
topic for my thesis, because it is so critical.
Whatever I accomplish herein, I do not accomplish
alone.

I am indebted to those teachers who have guided me,

feeble and faltering though I am, through the wondrous
world of philosophy_

I am also indebted to those thinkers

who have gone before me; I have a rich harvest to reap
because of their hard labor in the field.

Finally, I would

be remiss if I did not acknowledge my many friends and
fellow students.

My late hours in conversation with them

may have caused many a lost hour of sleep and a paper to
be late a time or two, but I can count much inspiration as
remuneration for the hours so spent.
am the richer for it.

I have learned and

I hope in this work to share some of

the wealth that has been so generously shared with me.
My heartfelt thanks are extended to Dr. Larry Mayhew,
an impeccable scholar, without whose help I would have done
nothing in this thesis but spin my wheels.

Any mistakes or

errors in judgment are my own, but without him they would
have been greatly multiplied.
must also extend my gratitude to my wife.

Since

am the world's greatest procrastinator and the world's
worst typist, I am deeply indebted to her on two accounts,
cajoling and typing.
As a final word before getting underway, I would like
to acknowledge with deepest gratitude the prayers of my
friends and family who plead my case before a merciful God.
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Fol.r major accounts of linguistic meaning are
considered.

A referential theory of meaning as developed

by Bertrand Russell is considered and releoted on the
grounds of some critical observations made by P. F.
Strawscn.

An instrumentalistic theory of meaning as

adopted by Ludwig Wittgenstein is next considered and found
after an evaluation by C. S. Chihara and J. A. Fodor to be
inconclusive.

A behavioristic theory of meaning as

advocated by Charles W. Morris is considered next.

Based

on questions posed by L. O. Kattscff this theory of meaning
is found tc be, at best, incomplete.

Finally, an

ideational account of meaning is considered.

The

traditional ideational account posed by John Locke is
rapidly rejected on the basis of his theory of idea; but a
theory of idea proposed by Brand Blanshard is found to
serve an ideational theory of meaning quite well.
Concluding the thesis is a brief summary and a prospectus.

CHAPTER ONE

MEANING AS REFERENCE

When confronted with a choice, the method for
determining a selection is as varied as there are choices
to be made.

An old favorite for making a choice is the

eeny-meeny-miny-mo method; but in philosophy this and
similar methods are not available.

In philosophy the

method is reason, and in keeping with that method this
thesis aims at a reasonable choice.
The range of choices presented in this thesis
represent some, but certainly not all, of the major
theories and theorists of meaning.

The works of Bertrand

Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Charles Morris and John Locke
will be considered.

Each of the theories as presented by

these remarkable men will be measured against their
critics' views, and will be found wanting in one or several
respects.
When Alice was commanded to state her case in Lewis
Carroll's Alice in Wonderland, she received the very good
advice to "begin at the beginning."

This advice shall be

ignored momentarily here in order to take a peek at the
end.

The final choice made in this essay will rest with

the theory of meaning advanced by Locke, but not without

some modification.
Columbus was wrong about several things, chiefly the
size of the world, and the belief that he had landed in the
near vicinity of India.

To his lasting glory though, he

was right on his major premise--the world indeed is round.
So, too, the conclusion of this essay will come to view
Locke; wrong on some critical points but right in this:
the meanings of words are the ideas for which they stand.
Were it not for some deeply embedded problems, the
referential theory of meaning would be the only game in
town.

This theory of meaning appeals so much to common

sense that it is perhaps the only theory entitled to claim
to represent the ordinary view of meaning.

This theory, as

developed by Bertrand Russell, will be considered first.
The referential theory of meaning, which basically
holds that the meaning of a word is the object to which it
refers, (so "Venus" means Venus, "red" means red, and so
on), has enormous appeal on first consideration.

But as

the theory is probed, problems crop up, problems which are
perhaps insoluble in character.

In recent philosophy one

of the principal advocates of a referential theory of
meaning has been Bertrand Russell.

His novel solutions to

the dilemmas presented by a referential theory of meaning
will be examined in the following pages, as well as some
telling criticisms of those solutions as presented by P. F.
Strawson.
Chapter sixteen of Russell's Introduction to
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Mathematical Philosophyl is the principal forum in which
Russell lays out the solutions he wishes to pose for some
nagging problems with reference and meaning.

The

foundation of the enterprise Russell is engaged in clearly
heralds the structure to be built upon it.

That foundation

is, in his words, "A iobust sense of reality," which is,
"very necessary in framing a correct analysis of
propositions about unicorns, golden mountains, round
squares, and other such pseudo-objects."2

Ultimately

Russell's own "robust sense of reality" leads him to adopt
the position that some terms, like "unicorn," are
significant, but as they occur in propositions they are
meaningless.

The chain of reasoning which leads him to

this position is worth examination.
One of the first distinctions which he draws is
between two kinds of descriptions, the definite
(corresponding to "the so-and-so") and the indefinite
(corresponding to "a so-and-so").

Through his analysis

Russell is led to affirm in the case of indefinite
descriptions that nothing is in fact described by them.

"A

unicorn" and "a man," as instances of the general form "a
1Bertrand Russell, Introduction to Mathematical
Philosophy (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1919)
Chapter 16 of Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy is
reprinted as Section 2.1, "Descriptions" pp. 166-175 in Jay
F. Rosenburg & Charles Travis, eds. Readings in the
Philosophy of Language (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: PrenticeHall, Inc., 1971). In citing Russell all page numbers cited
refer to this reprint.
2Russell, "Descriptions," Ibid., p. 168.
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so-and-so," are indefinite descriptions and as such they
describe no particular object--thus they describe nothing.
while it is true that there are men, e.g., Russell,
Strawson, and Wittgenstein, there is no object named by "a
man."

In Russell's own words:

Nevertheless, when we have enumerated all the men in
the world, there is nothing left of which we can say,
'This is a man, and not only so, but it is the 'a
man,' the quintessential entity that is just an
indefinite man without being anybody in particular.'3
The definite description, i.e., phrases of the form
"the so-and-so," present one with the opposite situation,
for they do seem to single out some particular object.
"The first man to set foot on the mcon. . ." is a phrase
which uniquely specifies one and only one individual,
separating him from all other men.

Such would also seem to

be the case with the name "Neil Armstrong."
a particular object is picked out.

In both cases

Russell provides this

definition:
(1) a name, which is a simple symbol, directly
designating an individual which is its meaning, and
having this meaning in its own right, independently of
the meanings of all other words; (2) a description,
which consists of several words, whose meanings are
already fixed, and from which results whatevec is to
be taken as the 'meaning' of the description.q
In the course of his comparison, one of the distinguishing
features he wishes to make clear is that names and definite
descriptions cannot be substituted for one another (even
when they ostensibly refer to the same object) without
3Ibid., p. 170.
4Ibid., p. 171.
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changing the character of the propositions in which they
occur.

"Scott is the author of Waverly," and "Scott is

Scott" ts the illustration Russell uses to make this point.
As Russell's analysis unfolds, it becomes clear to
him that a definite description functions just like an
indefinite description.

Neither names anything at all.

Properly speaking, names can only be applied to things
which in fact exist.

Descriptions only seem to name

something; properly analyzed they disappear altogether from
the propositions in which they occur.

This "seeming to

name" quality of descriptions, given Russell's definition
of a name, is crucial in view of the ontological
entailments of naming.

If "the present king of France"

does name, and in fact France is not a monarchy, then there
must be some kind of non-physical object designated by the
description.

In such an eventuality it can be seen that

the population of such pseudo-objects in the universe would
rapidly approach infinity--a conclusion which certainly
offends Russell's, and many others', robust sense of
reality.
Russell's solution is to use analysis to eliminate
descriptions from propositions in which they occur.

In the

statement, "The first man to set foot on the moon was
American," the description, "the first man to set foot on
the moon" would be analyzed as (1) at least one man first
set foot on the moon; (2) at most one man first set foot on
the moon; (3) whoever first set foot on the moon was
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American.

By means of this analysis, Russell is finally

led to conclude that
. . . what does not name anything is not a name,
and therefore, if intended to be a name, is a symbol
devoid of meaning, whereas a description, like 'the
present King of France,' does not become incapable of
occurring significantly merely on the ground that it
describes nothing, the reason being that it is a
complex symbol, of which the meaning is derived from
that of its constituent symbols.'
The terribly vexing problems of identity which attach
themselves to a referential theory of meaning as a matter
of course are to be solved, on Russell's view, through
engaging in a proper analysis (as above) of the
propositions in which identity statements occur.

One such

problem arises when one wishes to know if something, call
it S. is identical with something S'.

Thus, someone might

want to know whether Samuel Clemens is the author of
Huckleberry Finn.

What the person making such an inquiry

does not want to know is if Samuel Clemens is Samuel
Clemens.

Yet on a theory of identity which holds the

principle of the substitution of terms salve veritate, and
in which a definite description is taken as a name, the
reading of the query as "Is Samuel Clemens Samuel Clemens?"
is a distinct possibility.

Of course Russell's analysis of

the query eliminates the definite description altogether
and so the problem never arises.
Russell's position is clear.

Names have meaning in

virtue of the objects they pick out.
5Ibid , p. 174.

Descriptions are not
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names, hence, while they may occur significantly, they have
no meaning.

Their significance derives from the meaning of

their constituent parts.

"So-and-so is presently king"

names some individual, just is -France" names some country;
it is in these terms that the significance of "the present
king of France" is to be understood, but "the present king
of France" is not to be taken as a name simply because it
is constituted of names.

Though Russell's analysis

certainly solves problems, it is not itself unproblematic.
As Strawson has demonstrated, nis novel solutions are not
viable.
The first item on Strawson's agenda in "On Referring"
is a careful demarcation of what he calls the uniquely
referring use of expressions.6

Although he delineates

several classes of terms which typically serve a uniquely
referring use, (proper names among others); for present
purposes the focus will be restricted to expressions of the
form "the so-and-so."

Strawson's principal interest in

such expressions is when they appear as the subject of a
subject-predicate sentence.

However, he never supposes

that because an expression has a uniquely referring use
that its sole use is mentioning or referring.
Consider the expression "the ball-point pen."

As this

expression occurs in the sentence, "The ball-point pen is
6Like Chapter 16 of Introduction to Mathematical
Philosophy, P. F. Strawson's article "On Referring," Mind
LIX, No. 235 (1950): 320-344 is reprinted as Section 2.2.
"On Referring" in Rosenburg and Travis, Ibid., pp. 175-195;
and likewise, all page numbers cited refer to this reprint.
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the preferred writing instrument of students," it does not
serve a uniquely referring use.
designated by the expression.

No particular pen is
Yet in the sentence "The

ball-point pen is in the checkbook" the expression does
serve a uniquely referring use.

Some particular pen is

mentioned by the use of "the ball-point pen" in this case.
One important consequence of Russell's dichotomy of
names and descriptions which Strawson highlights is that a
uniquely referring expression can occur significantly in
only one of two ways:
(1) The first is that their grammatical form should be
misleading as to their logical form, and that they
should be analyzable, like s, as a special kind of
existential sentence. (2) The second is that their
grammatical subject should be a logically proper name,
of which the meaning is the individual thing it
designates.7
Russell's position withers under Strawson's penetrating
gaze; uniquely referring expressions fall into neither
class.

Clearly a uniquely referring expression may be used

on different occasions to mention different things.

There

are ball-point pens scattered all over this author's house:
the ball-point pen on the kitchen table; the ball-point pen
on the desk; the ball-point pen on the night-stand; and
there is even the ball-point pen under the couch.

Further,

when this writer's wife reads this, there will cease to be
"the ball-point pen under the couch."
"The ball-point pen" as an expression is identical as
it appears from place to place in the paragraph above.
7Strawson,
"On Referring," Ibid., p. 178.

The
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two significant differences as it appears are the different
uses to which it is put, i.e., to mention different pens,
and the fact that there are different "utterances" of the
expression, (as opposed to "The ball-point pen:
table; on the desk; .

.").

on the

Insofar as "the ball-point

pen" succeeds in referring to some particular pen only in
virtue of the different occasions for which it is employed,
it makes no sense to say of the expression "the ball-point
pen" that it refers to or mentions anything.

To quote

Strawson, "'Mentioning,' or 'referring,' is not something
an expression does; it is something that someone can use an
expression to do..,8
Similarly, "The ball-point pen under the couch has
blue ink" is used to assert scmething true or false
depending on the occasion of its utterance.

Prior to the

writer's wife having read this it is true or false.

After

she has read this the proper response is not "yes, true" or
"no, false," but rather, "There is no ball-point pen under
the couch" as indeed, perhaps there never was.

Making a

true or false claim about a ball-point pen, or any other
thing, is hardly possible when there is no mention or
reference to a ball-point pen.

Surely no sane person would

attempt to refer to the ball-point pen under the couch if
they did not believe there was a ball-point pen under the
couch.

Therefore, someone sincerely prefacing a proposal

with "the ball-point pen under the couch" would certainly
8Ibid., p. 180.
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agree with Russell's analysis (at least one ball-point pen
is under the couch, etc.), but their agreement with
Russell's account is a far different thing from being what
they are really saying.

In fact, they are attempting to

mention some particular pen in order to say something about
it.
In the main, Strawson aftirms:
It is a part of the significance of expressions of the
kind I am discussing that they can be used, in an
immense variety of contexts, to make unique
references. It is nc part of their significance to
assert that they are being so used or that the ,
conditions of their being so used are fulfilled.
Russell, homing in on definite descriptions, forgot
about the people who produce them.

If Russell ignored the

use of an expression though, the same can certainly not be
said about his friend and colleague Ludwig Wittgenstein.
For Wittgenstein, "use" is elevated from the humble estate
in which it has appeared in these pages and is bedight in
philosophical purple.

9Ibid., p. 186.

CHAPTER TWO

MEANING AS USE

The later philosophical writings of Wittgenstein
present unique problems of interpretation.

They certainly

do not follow the typical format of philosophical
literature; and perhaps this is one reason why even among
those who are sympathetic to his claims there is no broad
consensus on some fundamental issues.

Some (e.g., George

Pitcher) have interpreted Wittgenstein's position as a form
of behaviorism, while others (e.g., Alan Donagan) have
disputed this claim.1

Whichever way the debate is settled,

one thing is certain; Wittgenstein thought that the role of
words as tools employed by those who utter them was
critically important.
As Leonard Linsky has observed, for Wittgenstein, "The
meaning of an expression is the use (or uses) that it has
112
in some actual language game (or games).

For the most

part, the meaning of a word or expression is to be
understood in terms of its use.

In these terms asking for

-Donagan stakes out his position and highlights
Pitcher's in "Wittgenstein on Sensation" in George Pitcher,
ed., Wittgenstein: The Philosophical Investigations (Notre
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1968) pp. 324-52.
2Leonard Linsky, "Wittgenstein on Language and Some
Problems of Philosophy." journal of Philosophy 54 (May
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the meaning of a word makes about as much (or as little)
sense as asking for the significance of a pen apart from
its function as a writing instrument.
The notion of words as tools is intimately connected
in Wittgenstein's philosophy with the role these tools play
in some actual language game.

Knowing how to use language

is like knowing how to play a game.
like learning how to play a game.

Learning a language is

The focus is directed

towards the correct application of the elements of the
game.

If someone can do this, then it is said they know

how to play, and that is the end of the issue.

We do not

inquire into the significance of an element of the game
beyond its use in the game.

Consider remark (31):

When one shows someone the king in chess and says:
"This is the king," this does not tell him the use of
that piece - unless he already knows the rules of the
game up to this last point: the shape of the king.
You could imagine his having learned the rules of the
game without ever having been shown an actual piece.
The shape of the chessman corresponds here to the
sound of shape of a word.
One can also imagine someone's having learned the
game without ever learning cr formulating rules. He
might have learned quite simple board games first, by
watching, and have progressed to more and more
complicated ones. He, too, might be given the
explanation "This is the king," - if, for instance, he
were being shown chessmen of a shape he was not used
to. This explanation again only tells him the use of
the piece because, as we might say, the place for it
was already prepared. Or even: we shall only say
that it tells him the use, if the place is already
prepared. And in this case it is so, not because the
person to whom we give the explanation already knows
rules, but because in another sense he is already
master of a game.3

1957) pp. 285-92, p. 289.
3Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Philosophical investigations

i3

Throughout this remark there is a studied alternation
between a part of a game and its place in the game.

The

act of saying "This is the King; it can move like this,
. and so on," might be described as putting the part in
its place.

Once this has been done there is very little,

or nothing else left to dc.

But the act of putting the

part in its place is ipso facto to give the rules for its
use.

Hence, for the part to have a place in a game is for

that part to have rules governing its use.

Naturally

though, there are no rules governing every conceivable
circumstance.

Thus, if one were playing chess and the

black king, in a Lewis Carroll-like fashion, were to jump
up, march across the board, and throttle the white king, it
would be pointless to look for a rule governing such an
event.

Like the fabulous chair in remark (80),4 the shout

of "checkmate!" would be a fairly dubious use of the word.
Yet obviously there are appropriate conditions under
which one says "checkmate!"

The rules of the game

determine the conditions under which checkmate is attained.
When one plays in accordance with the rules, a certain move
will result in conditions by virtue of which saying
"checkmate!" is appropriate.

When certain conditions C

determine results R, then those conditions are, in
Wittgenstein's usage, criteria.

In the Blue Book

G.E.M. Anscombe, trans. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1967)
2nd. ed., p. 15.
4Ibid., p. 38.
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Wittgenstein is careful to discriminate between criteria
and symptoms.

He fleshes out the differences between these

two terms by way of an analogy to medicine.
If medical science calls angina an inflammation
caused by a particular bacillus, and we ask in a
particular case, "why do you say this man has got
angina?" then the answer, "I have found the bacillus
so-and-so in his blood" gives us the criterion, or
what we may call the defining criterion of angina. If
on the other hand the answer was, "His throat is ,
inflamed," this might give us a symptom of angina.'
From Wittgenstein's example and the discussion which
follows it, a criterion is clearly a sine qua non of that
which it is a criterion.

That is, if C is the criterion of

X, then if C. necessarily X obtains.

On the other hand, if

something S is a symptom of X, then the presence of S is
grounds for inferring X.

The principal difference between

criteria and symptoms is that where symptoms are merely
correlated with some X, criteria are conceptually connected
to some X.

A crucial observation Wittgenstein makes is

that in ordinary language people may flip-flop between what
functions as criteria and what functions as symptoms.

He

says for example, "It may be practical to define a word by
taking one phenomenon as the defining criterion, but we
shall easily be persuaded to define the word by means of
what, according to our first use, was a symptom."6
Typically, no one criterion functions as "the criterion" of
the applicability of P.

Typical, too, is that P is

5Idem, The Blue and Brown Books (New York: Barnes &
Noble, 1969) p. 25.
6Ibid., p. 25.

ID
sometimes applied on the basis of symptoms and sometimes
on the basis of criteria.
One more word about criteria.

The criteria are not

themselves that of which they are the criteria.

The

presence of the bacillus so-and-so in the bloodstream is
not itself angina, but it is the criterion of angina.

If

however, the discovery were made that the bacillus so-andso were widespread, but angina only appeared in persons
with certain genetic predispositions in combination with
the presence of the bacillus so-and-so, then a new concept
of angina would emerge. Throughout the shifts and changes
in criteria certain procedures can be performed utilizing
the given criteria to determine if someone has angina.
However, the criterion does not define itself, but only
that of which it is a criterion.

As Chihara and Fodor have

observed,
. . . these operations cannot be performed on the
standards themselves and hence neither standard can be
said to be an instance of either the predicate for
which it is a standard or of its negation.7
This brief outline of some salient features of
Wittgenstein's position follows roughly the pertinent areas
Chihara and Fodor have drawn attention to;8 for they figure
prominently in the charges Chihara and Fodor level at
7C. S.
Chihara and J. H. Fodor, "Operationalism and
Ordinary Language: A Critique of Wittgenstein" American
Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 2 1965, pp. 281-295.
Reprinted in George Pitcher, Ibid. It is to this reprint
that page number citations refer. p. 395.
8Ibid., pp. 388-395.
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Wittgenstein's position.

Chihara and Fodor's summary of

Wittgenstein's position is:
X is a criterion of Y in situations of type S if the
very meaning or definition of 'Y' . . . justify the
claim that one can recognize, see, detect, or
determine the applicability of
on the basis of X
in normal situations of type S.
As Chihara and Fodor develop Wittgenstein's position,
certain key points emerge quite clearly.

For instance, the

ascription of many predicates depends on the presence of
either a symptom or of criteria.

But the ascription of a

predicate on the basis of a symptom is only warranted if
there is (or has been) some criteria on the basis of which
the symptom is (was) correlated with that for which it is a
grounds for inference.

An inflamed throat can function as

a symptom of angina only because angina is defined.

The

defining criteria of angina establish angina as some Y with
which symptomatic predicates may be correlated.

In the

absence of such a relationship the question may always be
raised as to why an inflamed throat is a symptom of angina.
Wittgenstein argues that in lieu of detectable
criteria, it would be impossible to teach or learn the
meaning of some predicates, particularly psychological
predicates.

In their absence what could possibly count as

evidence that such predicates had been correctly applied?
Therefore, Chihara and Fodor conclude, the view that the
ascription of "pain" and other such predicates to other
persons is unwarranted is, on Wittgenstein's argument,
9Ibid., p. 397.
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"logically incompatible with the operation of the ordinary
“10

language rules for the application of these terms.
Chihara and Fodor claim that the extension of

Wittgenstein's arguments can lead to some quite implausible
results.

They elucidate their claims in terms of five

areas; concept counting, inductive generalization, first
person applications of psychological predicates, certain
claims regarding memory failure, and the scientific
investigations of some psychological states.

Two of these

areas, concept counting and inductive generalization, will
be discussed.
As previously noted, new medical discoveries may
result in new criteria for angina, but in such a case the
old concept is scuttled and replaced by the new.

Yet there

would seem tc be cases in which concepts would have to be
grossly multiplied on Wittgenstein's line of reasoning.
Ordinarily, claiming that so-and-so had a dream is
based upon the fact that so-and-so claimed, "I had this
wild dream last night. .

"

But this author, having

observed a two-year old child laughing and giggling in her
sleep, and mumbling some of the few words she knew, later
claimed that "Bethany had a dream last night."

In this

case, not only was no dream report given, none could have
been given.

Additionally, there are those cases in which,

based on sleep behavior, someone is told, "You dreamed all
night long" and his response is "I don't remember a thing."

10Ibid., p.

402.
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:he criteria that warrant the application of the phrase
"so-and-so dreamed" differ from first person dream reports,
to behavior with no possible report, to behavior with a
negative report.

On Wittgenstein's view, different concepts

of dreaming must be involved since the criteria which
warrant the application of the predicate do not coincide.
Dreaming to one side, a Wittgensteinian approach apparently
leads to at least two different concepts of sleep,
. . . one based upon report, one based upon
nonverbal behavior. But surely, this is an unnatural
way of counting concepts. Compare Malcolm's two
concepts of sleep with a case where it really does
seem natural to say that a special concept of sleep
has been employed, viz., where we say of a hibernating
bear that it sleeps through the winter.11
Apparently inductive generalization also presents
problems for a Wittgensteinian approach.

The E.E.G. was

developed to measure electrical activity in the brain.
Only later did someone think to use it to investigate
dreams.

By now a new concept of dream reports may have

been added to the inventory, but in that first use of the
E.E.G., it was clearly neither a criterion nor a symptom of
dream reports.

The investigators had to monitor the

machine and query the subjects to find out if there was
even the remotest correlation.

The gap in the

Wittgensteinian account is how the expectation of such a
correlation could have been rational; for,
One cannot have an inductive generalization over no
- I bid., p. 407. The work with which Chihara and
Fodor are engaged is Norman Malcolm, Dreaming (New York:
Humanities Press, 1962).
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observations; nor, in this case, was any higher level
"covering law" used to infer the probability of a
correlation between E.E.G. and dream reports.12
The last case mentioned is closely related to a much
deeper problem for the Wittgensteinian position.

The

history of science is replete with examples of existential
statements whose justification depends on
. . . the simplicity, plausibility, and
predictive adequacy of an explanatory system as a
whole, so that it is incorrect to say that relations
between statements which are mediated by such
explanations are either logical in Wittgenstein's
sense or contingent in the sense in which this term
suggest simple correlation.13
Perhaps the most outstanding example of such a
statement is the theory of gravitation.

Since Newton's day

and until Einstein's, scientist have not been entirely
satisfied with gravitation, which seems to involve
mysterious "action at a distance."

Yet this problem has

been outweighed by the "simplicity, plausibility, and
predictive adequacy" of the theory of gravitation.

When

Newton proposed his theory he appealed to nothing like
criteria or symptoms, but if anything to the schema cited
above.

An apple falling to the ground is neither

contingently correlated with gravity nor a conceptual truth
which can be inferred from knowing the meaning of "an
object falling to the ground."

Chihara and Fodor

illustrate this argument by citing the example of the
cloud -chamber invented by C. T. R. Wilson.
12Ibid., p. 408.
13Ibid., p. 411.

As they state,
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the relation between the Wilson cloud-chamber and the paths
of charged particles does not involve a conceptual truth,
i.e., "C. T. R. Wilson did not learn what 'path of a
charged particle' means by having the cloud-chamber
explained to him."

Equally clear is the fact that taking

the formation of bands of fog in the cloud-chamber "as
indicators of the paths of the particles is not observed
correlations between streaks and some criterion of motion
of charged particles."

Where Y is some predicate, and X is

some state of affairs on the basis of which Y is
justifiably applied (e.g., Y = gravitation and X = an apple
falling to the ground), Chihara and Fodor conclude, "X need
correlate.“14
not have the form of either a criterion or a
Therefore radical skepticism is not the only alternative to
a system of justification based on criteria and symptoms.
Suggesting that a person can learn the meaning of
terms such as "pain” in the absence of criteria is not as
implausible as Wittgenstein suggests.

Nor is it

implausible to suggest that even children are capable of
learning the meaning of terms such as "pain" on the basis
of theoretical inference.

On the contrary, one does not

have to be around a young child who is producing an
incessant stream of "whys?" and "how comes?" for very long
before it begins to look as though the child is engaged in
an activity very similar to that of the scientist.

On this

reading, "pain" is not something one learns the meaning of
14Ibid., pp. 409-410.
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only from one's own case, but it also has a place in a
wider system of belief, expectation, and intention.

It is

subject to modification, clarification, and expansion.

In

short, "pain" can start out as personal sensation and endup as a powerful explanatory weapon in the theoretical
armament of a growing mind.
In conclusion, there are consequences for adopting a
Wittgensteinian approach to meaning which run counter to an
ordinary view of psychological predicates.

In lieu of

reasonable alternatives to Wittgenstein's later philosophy
these problems might be taken for the sake of the general
satisfaction his theory affords, but there are reasonable
alternatives.

In particular, the kinds of justification

which scientists employ in promoting their theories seem
particularly immune to analysis in terms of criteria and
symptoms.

In addition, theoretical inference as a species

of justification is at least plausible in other, general
systems of explanation.
This section began by noting the debate on how
Wittgenstein's philosophy of language ought to be
characterized.

In the next section an unabashedly

behavioristic account of meaning will be considered.

CHAPTER THREE

MEANING AS BEHAVIOR

L. 0. Kattsoff has written a brief article entitled
"What is Behavior?"'

The question raised by the title is a

portent of things to come, for there are several important
questions which Kattsoff poses in the course of his
analysis of some critical issues which spring from C. W.
Morris' magnum opus Signs, Language, and Behavior.2

In the

following pages an attempt will be made to flesh out the
questions Kattsoff poses in order to see exactly why it is
that these questions should keep Morris awake at night.
The position adopted by Morris is straightforward and
simple.

Signs, Language, and Behavior can be understood in

terms of two major impulses.

The first impulse is the

desire on the part of Morris to establish a unified science
of semiotic.

The second impulse is his desire to

demonstrate the utility of the axioms which he advances
throughout the book.
Establishing a unified science of semiotic would be no

1L. O. Kattsoff, "What is Behavior," Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research, 20 (Sept. 1948): 98-102.
2Charles Morris, Signs, Language, and Behavior, (New
York: George Braziller, Inc., n.d.; reprint ed. Englewood
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1946).
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mean feat. and Signs, Language, and Behavior is no mean
effort in that direction.

The principal obstacle which

Mcrris addresses in the bid for a unified science of
semiotic is the creation of a vocabulary in terms of which
the science of semiotic can fulfill its' mission.
generates this vocabulary by fiat.

Morris

His aim in this regard

is not to provide a descriptive terminology, but rather to
provide a functional terminology.

His objective is to

articulate a set of given terms, and then to investigate
language through those terms.

The most significant

decision he makes in the book concerns the character of the
terms he develops.

Morris chooses to eliminate mentalistic

terms from the basic vocabulary of semiotic, and elects
instead to develop the vocabulary in strictly behavioristic
terms.
The second impulse manifests itself in Morris'
attempts to show that the terms whose definitions he has
stipulated are adequate for an analysis of language.

For

example, not only does he stipulate four ways in which
signs may be used he also makes the claim, "These are the
most general sign usages; other usages are subdivisions and
specializations of these four."3

In addition to the

special adequacy of his terms, Morris also believes the
behavioristic mold in which they are cast is adequate.

He

believes that not only may all the different usages of signs
be brought under the rubric of his fourfold division, but
3Ibid., p.
95.
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also his fourfold division of sign usage does not require
the addition of any mentalistic terms in order to
successfully interpret sign use.

Overall, it may be

affirmed that Morris feels his twin impulses have been
satisfied.

He has created a precise, empirical vocabulary

for the science of semiotic and his vocabulary is entirely
adequate without having to employ mentalistic terms.
The first twist in the path pursued by Morris which
causes Kattsoff to question the course, is the
characterization of statements as informative or incitive.
This characterization is part of the broader scheme
mentioned above in which Morris discusses at length the use
of signs.

His focus is signs and ". . . their relation to

the purposive behavior in which they are produced and which
they serve."

Morris further declares that, "Signs in

general serve to control behavior in tne way something else
would exercise control if it were present.

Finally,

Morris categorizes the use of signs in four brcad areas.
They are the informative, valuative, incitive, and systemic
uses.
For Kattscff and the present discussion the two uses
of interest are the informative and the incitive.

The

informative use according to Morris occurs when ". . . signs
are produced in order to cause someone to act as if a
certain situation has certain characteristics."4Ibid., pp. 92 & 95.
5Ibid., p. 97

If a dog
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is habitually fed from either of two pans and a bell is
rung when the food is in the first pan, then the ringing of
the bell will function in the manner Morris describes as
informative.

The dog would seek food, provided that it

wanted food, in the first pan even if it could not see or
smell what was in the first pan.

By seeking food in the

first pan on hearing the ringing of the bell, the dog is
'acting as if a certain situation had certain
characteristics.'

By contrast the incitive use occurs when

. . signs are produced in order to determine how the
interpreter of the sign is to act to something, that is, to
call out more or less specific responses."6

By contrast to

the informative use, here it is possible for the
interpreter to know what characteristics obtain in a
certain situation, but a sign is produced in order to
control behavior in spite of that knowledge.

Thus the dog

may know what pan the food is in, but a buzzer sounds which
causes the dog to either stop or start eating.
On the level of humans the incitive use of signs might
be characterized as verbal arm twisting.

The aim of the

incitive use of signs is to incite the interpreter of such
a sign to some particular course of action.

One issue

which Morris never bothers to address is how the kind of
persuasion involved in an incitive use of signs is not
also and eo ipso an informative use.

Simply stated,

it is difficult to understand how someone can be persuaded
6Ibid., p.102.
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to do something, unless they are also (or have been)
informed of the consequences of not doing what they are
being incited to dc.

Although Morris does take note of

this possibility, the potential it contains for creating
ambiguity between the incitive and the informative use of
signs does not provoke any explanations on his part.
Given these two broad categories of sign use though,
Kattsoff considers the statement, "This man says that human
beings are descended from more primitive forms of life."
And his question in turn is "how can it be determined
whether the statement is intended as informative or
incitive, and how can it be ascertained whether it
functions as informative or incitive?"7

This question

actually draws the heat of its critical fire from two
sources.

(1) It focuses attention on the utility, or lack

thereof, of the classification of use of signs as agents of
behavioral control and (2) it focuses attention on how
Morris responds to the absence of overt behavior even
though signs are being used and understood.

These two

aspects of the question will be considered in order.
First, a statement like "This man says that human
beings are descended from more primitive forms of life"
might be used by a politician to persuade people not to
vote for "this man."

Yet the same statement might also be

used by a biology teacher to indicate to her students which
doctrines "this man" held.

Significantly, in either case

7Kattsoff, Ibid., p. 99.
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the intended use might have a contrary effect.

So the

politician might use the statement incitively yet his
audience might only be informed and not persuaded at all.
Likewise, the principal effect on the students might be
If the students are rabid creationists they

incitive.

might decide to burn in effigy the man described by their
teacher.

As Kattsoff observes,

As a matter of fact, whether the statement is intended
as informative or incitive can only be ascertained
from the user (in this case the speaker); and whether
it functions as informative 9r incitive can only be
ascertained from the hearer.'
The problem for Morris comes down to this:

the

relation between bells and buzzers as controlling agents,
and the behavior of dogs controlled by bells and buzzers is
relatively clear.

Nothing like this obtains in the case of

humans and statements.

Where the intended effect of a

buzzer and its actual results in the dog's behavior form a
fairly tight bond, between the intended effect and actual
results in humans there evidently exists a veritable chasm.
Morris clearly states that signs serve the purpose of
controlling behavior, but his analysis of sign uses shows
how easily the relation between control and controlling
agent is breached.

This is a problem for Morris because

his discussion takes no note of the reliability with which
the species of control sought is identical to the species
of control which actually results from some particular use
of a sign.

Behavioristic analyses in general depend for

9Ibid., p. 99.
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their efficacy on a clear delineation of conditioning and
the stimulus-response syndrome.

A dog that occasionally

sits when told "sit" has not been successfully conditioned.
In this case the dog has failed to "understand" the sign.
Yet, there is an understandable reluctance to take a
breakdown of the informative/incitive dichotomy on the part
of humans as a breach of understanding.
If Morris were attempting to classify signs according
to use, this enterprise would obviously fail.

The same

sign could be used in any of the ways mentioned by Morris
under different circumstances; and of course a
classification which does not discriminate is vacuous.

But

this approach which Morris does not use is described here
only because there are situations in which it would be
useful.

A dog might be trained in the following way:

whistles to indicate the location of objects, bells to give
commands, buzzers to tell if an object is friend or foe.
So one might whistle, ring a bell, and sound a buzzer to
get a dog to go to and growl at an object one hundred yards
to his immediate left.

Under such a system the utility of

designating classes of signs by virtue of their use is
evident.

As an example, the sign genus "whistle" would

have an informative use.
correlated with behavior.

This use would be reliably
Whistles as such, i.e., the mere

quality of the sound, would parse the behavior of the dog
in terms of the genus of which some particular whistle was
an exemplar.
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The aforementioned kind of classification, certainly a
legitimate behavioristic program, is not Morris' program.
By contrast, what he is engaged in, namely the uses of
signs distinct from signs so used is brought more sharply
into focus.

So stated, Kattsoff's question can be posed

with greater vigor.

Does Morris determine the function of

a statement from the sign producer or from the sign
interpreter?

If the function of a statement is to be

determined in reference to the sign producer, then Morris
has a long, tough row to hoe--for in this direction Morris
must certainly encounter the intentions, beliefs, hopes and
expectations of the person making use of some statement.
In short, there are a host of inner, mental states which
Morris is going to have to consider and eliminate if he is
going to preserve the behavioristic cast of his semiotics.
But locating the function of a statement with the
interpreter leads to the second focus of the question,
namely the response of Morris to the absence of overt
behavior.
There are conditions under which no overt response
will be made to a statement.

Kattsoff illustrates this

point by noting that the statement, "This man says that
human beings are descended from more primitive forms of
life," might be uttered in the course of a speech, in which
case the audience would be likely to continue to behave
after hearing the statement as before hearing the
statement, i.e., sitting and listening.

In this context
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Morris would rely on the concept of a disposition to
respond.
Yet this being the case, the original formulation
proposed by Morris for the incitive and informative uses of
signs can no longer stand.

As Kattsoff suggests they must

be reformulated so that they are used to control not
behavior, but the disposition to behave.

Morris clearly

affirms the principal that the use of signs is to control
behavior as would the thing signified control behavior if
it were present.

Yet in many cases, as illustrated by

Kattsoff's statement, actual and present behavior is not
controlled by the use of signs.

Is the motion of a

student's hand who is marking "true" by the statement
"George Washington was the first president of America"
being controlled by a statement made weeks or months
earlier in the semester by the teacher?

Surely not.

At

best only the disposition to respond with "true" to the
statement is controlled by the teacher's previous
informative utterance.

But in order for Morris to know how

some sign functioned, he must wait and observe until some
overt behavior occurs.

A disposition to respond is a

particular disposition to some limited range of response
patterns.

Certainly Morris would not want any response at

all, say eating an apple, to count as the terminal behavior
generated by the disposition to respond to, "This man says
that human beings are descended from more primitive forms
of life."

The intimate link between disposition and
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response, and the critical role played by dispositions in
Morris' theory leads to Kattsoff's second important
question, "how in a behavioristic theory is

. . a

disposition to respond observed?"9
Early on in Signs, Language, and Behavior, Morris
states, "Any organism for which something is a sign will be
called an interpreter.

The disposition in an interpreter

to respond, because of the sign, by response-sequences of
some behavior-family will be called an interpretant."1°
According to Morris in meaningful discourse, what is
significantly present when we hear and understand a sign is
the interpretant of the sign.

But the interpretant

produces, under proper circumstances, response-sequences,
which consist of overt behavior.

Now, an interpretant,

i.e., a disposition, is not itself the behavior in question
and is not observed.

Rather the response-sequence is what

is observed and is in some sense the measure of what, if
any, interpretant is present.

This formulation leads rather

naturally to a solution which frees Morris from the onerous
task of following his subjects until such time as they
choose to display behavior which indicates the presence of
some interpretant.

The solution is, in Kattsoff's words,

. . . that if in the majority of instances in
which a given thing is presented to an interpreter,
that interpreter responds in a certain definite way,
then in those instances in which he does not respond
we can assume that a disposition to respond was

9Ibid., p. 99.
10Morris, Ibid., p. 17.
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produced but did not result in behavior. 11
Adopting this position, though, would signal deep trouble
for Morris.
Morris avers that, ". . . the introductio:. of 'idea'
into the criterion for a sign was to permit us to say that
something may be a sign to someone even when no overt
behavior occurs."12

As a corollary to this he claims the

concept of interpretant, i.e., a disposition to respond, is
more scientific than the notion of idea, and is more
amenable to empirical investigation.

For this reason he

advocates replacing, at least in formal discourse, the term
"idea" with the term "interpretant."
For the problem of determining whether another person
has an idea is not methodologically different from
determining whether a dog has an idea. True, the
other person may utter the words, 'The buzzer makes me
. the
think of food at a certain place.' But .
reliability of this evidence can only be checked if we
are in possession of some criterion to determine
whether the buzzer is or is not a sign of food at a
given place.13
Morris' motivation in this respect is certainly laudable,
but he has established a standard his own theory cannot
measure up to.

His recognition of cases where no overt

behavior comes to pass now puts him in a peculiar position.
Even granting that reliable behavioral criteria have been
established for some sign, Kattsoff wonders in those cases
in which that sign produces no overt behavior, "If anything

11Kattsoff, Ibid., p. 100.
12Morris, Ibid., p. 30.
p. 29.
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is a sign which causes a disposition to respond, how is a
disposition to respond observed.?"4

As Kattsoff explains,

a disposition to respond is not yet an actual response, and
so remains, like an idea, an inner event unavailable to
scientific observation.

Morris may of course opt to assume

that a parade of dispositions are produced in a person whc
attends a lecture.

If, however, Morris were to remain

adamant in his exclusion of, "something inside the
interpreter whose nature apparently is that of idea or
thought,"5 then he will be forced to admit that he cannot
determine in many instances whether or not something is or
is not a sign:

since it is given that X is a sign when X

causes a disposition to respond, Morris, being unable to
observe dispositions, cannot empirically verify the
presence of a disposition.

Hence the status of X as a sign

must remain undisclosed.
There are no doubt significant refinements which could
usefully be made by Morris to his theory.

As it stands,

however, would appear to be something less than adequate.
Morris very plainly wants to include both observable
criteria and dispositions in his theory of semiotic, but he
cannot have it both ways.

Observable behavior alone does

not allow enough of language use to count as meaningful.
But the role which Morris has assigned to dispositions
either jeopardizes the investigation of signs, or else
14Kattsoff, Ibid., p. 99.
15Ibid., p. 100.

34

seriously undermines his claims to have eliminated inner
states, "whose nature is apparently that of idea or
thought."

John Locke certainly would not have approved of

Morris' attempts in this direction.

Contrarily, he

proposed a theory of signs in which the meaning of a sign
is the idea for which it stands; and to the ideational
theory of meaning this investigation now turns.

CHAPTER FOUR

MEANING AS IDEA

The ideational theory of meaning was first explicitly
formulated by John Locke.

He states in An Essay Concerniag

Human Understanding, "The use, then, of words is to be the
sensible mark of ideas; and the ideas they stand for are
their proper and immediate signification."1

This concept

of meaning has a sort of instant appeal to common sense;
for people certainly do speak and use language to
communicate ideas; i.e., let others know what is on their
minds.

Yet for this formulation to appeal to philosophical

sense as well as to common sense, some explanation of an
idea is needed, and this is where the ideational theory of
meaning has in the past found itself caught between the
devil and the deep blue sea.
In his article on meaning in The Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, William P. Alston has identified three areas
for which the ideational theory of meaning must provide
explanations if

is to be persuasive.2

three areas as questions the results are

Formulating these
(1) Can thought

1 John

Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding,
ed. Peter H. Nidditch (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1975),
P. 405 (Book III, Chap. 2, Sec. 1).
?
-Paul Edwards, ed., The Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
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be reasonably characterized as something which exists
independently of language?

(2) Are people able to call up

appropriate ideas in association with specific meaning?
and (3) Can word/idea association be explained in noncircular terms?

Here these three questions are taken to be

definitive of the minimum labor which must be undertaken in
defense of the ideational theory of meaning.
As is evident from the kind of inquiry dictated by the
questions themselves, what the ideational theorist needs is
a theory of idea, or thought, which will survive close
scrutiny.

A suitable theory of idea will answer all three

questions at the same time.

To this end Locke proposed an

account of ideas which seemed to him well met for the task
at hand.

Yet, in philosophical circles his theory of ideas

has been treated like a red-headed stepson.

This chapter

will examine his theory of idea briefly for two reasons; it
is of great historical importance in the development of the
ideational theory of meaning, and seeing where it went awry
will eliminate one path along which an ideational theory of
meaning might be developed.
To serve a theory of meaning, two refinements of the
theory of idea as image are necessary and which Locke is
quick to aver in book three of An Essay Concerning Human
Understanding.

First, since an image is necessarily an

image of some sensible quality, there must be some relation

The Macmillan Company and The Free Press, N.Y. 1967, s.v.
"Meaning", by William P. Alston.

37

between every meaningful word and some sensible quality.
The principle form this relation takes for Locke is
historical, he says, "And I doubt not, but if we could
trace them to their sources, we should find, in all
Languages, the names, which stand for things that fall not
under our senses, to have had their first rise from
sensible ideas."3

Failing the strong etymological

association, as between "breath" and "spirit," Locke
supposes that words for sensible ideas may be expropriated
in an analogical use for nonsensible ideas.
Second, since people know by intimate familiarity with
their own conscious processes that there is seldom a
torrent of images cascading through the mind as they speak,
the immediate presence of an image may not be regarded as a
necessary component of meaningful speech.

For Locke the

utility and significance of an expression stems from the
constancy of association between an expression and an idea.
The link forged between idea and expression is a bridge
which is not always traversed when either idea or
expression occurs, but one which is constantly present and
could be traversed when idea or expression appears.

So in

English the term "dog" is the bridge to the idea of
dogness, crossing which there is, lo and behold, an image
of a dog.

Further, just as one does not have to actually

cross a certain bridge to know that it leads to some
particular town, neither does one have to cross the bridge
3Locke, Ibid. p. 403 (Book III, Chap. 1, Sec. 5).
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between word and image on every occasion in order to know
the meaning of the term.
Even with these refinewents in place the reduction of
meaning to image faces several hard problems.

Two such

problems occur when meaning and image are examined in terms
of their covariance in significant differences and
Descartes first raised the problem of the

similarities.

chilagon to plague Locke's theory.

The terms "chilagon"

and "figure with a thousand and ten sides" differ
significantly in meaning.

Yet it would require a

prodigious, nay, heroic imagination which could produce or
maintain an image between the twain which varied in the
same degree of significance.

If the image a person had of

a chilagon had even one more or one less side than a
thousand, that person could not be said to know the meaning
of "chilagon."

Indeed, if that person's image was vague,

there could be no conclusion but that his meaning too, was
vague.
The reverse situation is also vexing for Locke's
theory.

Sameness of meaning may be accompanied by wide

divergences in images people associate with some
expression.4

For one person the image associated with

'peace' might be of himself lying on a haystack watching
4 Alston in his article on meaning states, "The word
'deg' in its usual sense, may at one time be accompanied by
the image of a collie, at another time by the image of a
terrier, on one occasion by the image of a dog sitting, on
another by the image of a dog standing, and so on." s.v.
"Meaning," Paul Edwards, Ibid.
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the clouds go by; for another person a very different image
might accompany 'peace,' e.g., sitting by a fireplace
reading a book.

Consider also a child who is being taught

the numbers one, two and three.

One mother might use

oranges to try and teach these numbers, and another mother
may use buttons.

If ever afterward the children so taught

had somewhere in mind the images of oranges or buttons when
they spoke or rad one, two, or three, their images would
certainly be very different while their meanings would
certainly be the same.
Locke's theory of meaning is wrecked on his theory of
idea.

Though his characterization of ideas was couched

largely in visual terms, even it images were arrayed in the
full panoply of sensation, there would still be problems.
The theory still would not pass muster in the service of
semantic utility even if images were redolent with odor,
and could be tasted, touched and heard.

Further, if in

addition to the criticisms mentioned above, Berkeley's
observations of the difficulties of imaging a triangle
which is neither scalene, nor right, nor equilateral, nor
isosceles yet is all at once are added,5 then any attempt
to satisfy a theory of meaning by utilization of
representation will have to answer the same fundamental
criticisms.

Therefore if an ideational theory of meaning

is to be proposed, a theory of idea as representation must
5 George Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles
of Human Knowledge in The Empiricists, (Garden City, New
York: Doubleday & Co., Dolphin Books, n.d.), p. 143.
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be scuttled.
There are broad implications as well as an overall
simplicity to the theory of idea as image.

Where it serves

a theory of meaning, it serves very well, as for example
being noncircular: but where it fails, it fails completely.
Therefore, the theory of ideas as images must be recorded
in the book of philosophical misadventures.

But, if the

image must be left in that dusty tome, the ic.:ational
theory of meaning does not, as a consequence, have to be
left there too--for Brand Blanshard has put forward a
theory of idea, though not specifically in connection with
a theory of meaning, which will serve the ideational theory
of meaning quite well.
Blanshard's theory of idea is:
• • . in briefest compass this: Thought in its
essence is an attempt to attain, in the sense of
achieving identity with, a special end of its own.
The relation between idea and object must be conceived
teleologically, as the relation of that which is
partially realized to the same thing more fully
realized. When we say that an idea is of an object,
we are saving that the idea is a purpose which the
object alone would actualize, a content informed by an
impulse to become this object. Its nature is hence
not fully intelligible except in the light of what it
seeks to become. Mind, in taking thought, attempts to
pass beyond its present experience to what it would be
but is not yet, and so far as it has the thought of
this end, it already is the end in posse. The idea is
thus both identical with its object and different from
it. It is identical in the sense in which anything
that truly develops is identical with what it becomes.
It is different in the sense in which any purpose
partially realized is different from the same purpose
realized wholly.6
6Brand Blanshard, The Nature
of Thought 2 vol. (New
York: The Macmillan Company, 1940) 1:473.
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Blanshard's theory of idea is wide and deep, yet what
is gained in this measure of taking it, is lost in the
measure of simplicity and any commonsensical appeal which
the theory of idea as image held.

Yet what is lost in

commonsense appeal, is gained in the appeal to reason.
Blanshard's theory may be attacked from any of several
directions, which he himself recognized and was careful to
respond to.

In as much as this essay is ccnfined to a

discussion of meaning, the examination of Blanshard's
theory will be confined to the terms of a theory of
meaning.

In short, does the theory of idea put forward by

Blanshard resolve the uncertainties adumbrated by the three
definitive questions posed earlier?
The possibility of thought existing independently of
language is answered with a resounding "yes" by Blanshard's
theory of thought.

Indeed, it would not be far off the

mark to characterize the first 254 pages of The Nature of
Thought as an argument supporting just this type of claim.
From the outset Blanshard claims that, "The simplest form
of thought is, by general admission, judgment; and
perception in turn is the simplest form of this."7

His

arguments that thought is a critical element of perception,
cut a broad swath through both philosophy and psychology.
Blanshard finds support on the one hand through an
analysis of perception from the philosopher's vantage
point.

Thus he notes that where sensations are simply

7Ibid., p. 51.
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given, perceptions may be true or false, and the quality of
being true or false is the distinctive trait of judgments.
The optical illusion is a case in point; for most certainly
the photons reflected from the image do not deceive the
viewer; rather, due to the arrangement of the elements of
the illusion, the viewer is led to make an error in
perceptual judgment.
On the other hand, Blanshard has examined the work of
psychologists and found confirmation of his position there,
too.

Blanshard argues that there is an inferential element

in perception.

Against this position some have argued

persuasively that perception involves direct apprehension,
rather than inference.

Their position has certain

experiments in psychology as the substance of their
foundation.

Even when their case seems strongest though,

Blanshard finds good reasons for supposing that direct
apprehension is not the unavoidable conclusion to be drawn
from these experiments.
One such experiment involved subjects who gazed
through a hole with one eye.

The only features visible to

them were an illuminated white wall and a vertically
suspended thread.

As the thread was gradually moved away

from the subject, they detected its motion.

The

interesting fact is that there was no accompanying
sensation of the thread growing more narrow as it moved
away.

Hence, some have claimed, there was no basis for

inferring the motion of the thread and therefore its motion
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was directly apprehended.

Not so, says Blanshard:

I should have supposed that when one was looking at a
thread with one eye, it would be far from easy to be
sure whether the thread as sensed grew thinner or not,
and that if 4.t did, nothing would be easier than to
overlook it.
This indeed is the interpretation of
the experiment offered by Jaensch and others; there
was a sensory difference that passed unnoticed.
Koffka replies that 'this removes the last vestige of
plausibility from this theory. . .Since I cannot judge
about something I am not aware of, the term judgment
must have a different meaning from the ordinary one';4
and it seems to him incredible that a judgment should
be based on what is 'unnoticed, i.e., unexperienced.'
-To argue from changes in the retinal image would
beg an important question as Koffka rightly points out.
2Ibid., pp. 86-7.
Blanshard makes three observations which seriously
undermine Koffka's judgment.

First, there is a difference

between being unnoticed and inexperienced.

As a particular

instance, Blanshard cites breathing, which is certainly
unnoticed most of the time, but it would be presumptuous to
suppose that while unnoticed there had been no experience
of the many sensations which accompany breathing.

Secondly,

Blanshard points out that the grounds of a judgment and what
the judgment is about must be clearly distinguished.

In

terms of the experiment, the judgment about the motion of
the thread, which the subjects were aware of, is very
different from the grounds on which the subjects based that
judgment.

Sealing his case then, Blanshard finally

observes the ubiquity of judgments about something when the
8Ibid., p. 104. The work by Koffka
which Blanshard is
citing (to which his second note refers) is Kurt Koffka,
Principals of Gestalt Psychology (New York: Harcourt,
Brace & Co., 1935).

grounds of such judgments are not part of explicit
awareness.

For example, in interpersonal relationship it

often happens that a judgment of character is formed when
first meeting someone.

Yet if pressed the person forming

such a judgment cannot explain why that particular judgment
was formed.
If Blanshard finds room for inference in the
experiments which seem to suggest direct apprehension, his
case in other experiments is strong indeed.

In one such

experiment apes were placed in a cage with a stick.
Outside of the cage was food, but it was beyond the reach
of the short stick which the ape had.

However, within

reach of the short stick, but outside of the cage, was a
longer stick which could reach the food.

Some apes would

then put two and two together, as it were, and use the
short stick to reach the long stick and in turn use the
longer stick to get the food.

Blanshard comments on this

as follows:
We must suppose that as he contemplates the stick, it
somehow presents itself to him in a new setting, with
the short stick as a means to it, and it in turn as a
means to the fruit. We need not say that there is any
picture of this arrangement in his mind, or that there
is anything at all in mind explicitly but the long
stick that he sees; nor is it likely that without some
part of the device actually before him, he ever
manages to think of it. His thinking is undoubtedly
thinking, but it is still anchored to sense; he cannot
summon up and dismiss ideas independently of what the
senses are pressing on him; his thought is perceptual
thought.9
Blanshard's line of argument supports the idea that
9Ibid., pp. 248-9.
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thought is present even when language is not.

Just as

clearly he does not mean to exclude the kind of thought he
finds in apes from humans; for he never supposes that such
thought is explicit.

He says for instance,

. . . the hue and cry against the old theory that
perceptual process is quasi-syllogistic has been more
vigorous than convincing. Of course the view that
every time I pick up a pencil I am formulating a fullblown syllogism is absurd enough if it seems that
premises and conclusion are distinctly and explicitly
present. But have the holders of the inference theory
ever believed that? What they have held, I take it,
is this, that one can see on later reflection that
three terms must have been implicitly present even
though not singled out, and that the passage between
4
them was effected in a way which, if the process
been explicit, we should have called syllogistic.'
At the same time that thought on the perceptual level
is not explicit, neither is it so simple as to be rendered
useless even for the most complex activities.

Blanshard is

careful to recognize the vast differences in capacity for
thought between fish and apes, and apes and man.

While

thought at the perceptual level may involve nothing more
complex than the judgment of how to get some fruit beyond
one's reach, such thought may extend even into the most
profound of human activities.

Blanshard avers:

. there may be an astonishing contrast
between one's authority in recognition, and one's
helplessness in explicit thought. Saints are seldom
distinguished as moral philosophers, yet their sense
of what to do in a concrete case is probably more
unerring; excellent artists have not infrequently made
themselves ludicrous when they have tried to talk
10Ibid., p. 89. On pages 95-96 Blanshard
discriminates among several senses of the term "implicit"
and describes his sense of the term as in, "One may be
aware of something and use it as a ground without singling
it out for full and specific attention."
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about aesthetics.
Now, Blanshard's theory of idea is not so simple as to
stop at thought at the perceptual level, because to stop
there would fall far short of an adequate characterization
of thought.

His theory does include a discrimination

between the tied idea and the free idea; i.e., ideas which
are perceptually tied and ideas which are free from the
restrictions of a presently given perception.

It is the

free idea which has the greatest affinity to language.

ve

it would be a mistake to believe on account of this
bicameral division of ideas that Blanshard's theory of idea
presupposes a difference in principle between thought at
the level of tied ideas and thought at the level of free
ideas.

In point of fact he states that

We have made no attempt to distinguish between an
earlier use of ideas and the later making of judgment,
for there really is no distinction; to have an idea is
to judge from the very first, not explicitly or
determinately, perhaps, but still to judge. . . . The
growth of mind consists less in an addition of
faculties and process than in a fuller and more
explicit function of processes that are at work
already. 12
Though Blanshard develops his theory of idea beyond
the level of thought at the perceptual level, it may be
safely reiterated that his theory leaves no doubt as to the
independence of thought from language.

Therefore the

exploration of his theory in terms of the second question
is in order:

is it possible to call up appropriate ideas

11Ibid., p. 250.
12Ibid., p. 542.
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in association with specific meaning?
An inventory of several statements Blanshard has made
indicate a positive answer to this question.

Thus,

• • . a prism, once its way of diffracting light
has peen pointed out to a child, may always suggest
this property when it appears later. But so may the
word 'diffraction' suggest it; and thus whenever the
child comes upon this word in his reading, or hears it
in conversation, he is called upon to form the idea
again. 13
The arrangement Blanshard has presented is clearly the
relation required to yield a positive answer to the
question.

The relation envisaged is between a sensible

quality and the discrete idea precipitated by the hearing
of it.

Just as some compound can be present in a solution,

and the addition of some other compound cause it to
precipitate out of the solution, so too, the word seems to
Blanshard to precipitate the idea from the mists of the
mind.
Much the same process can be characterized of the tied
ideas which occur at the perceptual level.

Blanshard

adduces three elements present in the tied idea which serve
as the springboard for free ideas.

In his outline of these

three elements a clear picture can be obtained of the
fitness of such ideas in the contexts in which they occur.
The three elements present are inference, discrimination,
and background; all in their implicit state.

Consider

these elements in the following series of examples.
If one were to go into the kitchen for a late-night
13Ibid., p. 545.

48

snack, and spy an orange in the fruit basket on the kitchen
table, a series of implicit inferences might follow.

The

orange is sweet and juicy, it will quell one's rumbling
stomach, and so forth.

Even philosophers, considering the

late-night hour, might not be aware of formulating such
judgments--but that they are there and are judgments is
witnessed to by the chagrin of discovering that one's wife
has put a papier-mache orange in the fruit basket.

In this

case one has taken something at face value and found that
behind the face was no personality at all!

It may be said

with some confidence that such judgments are distinct and
appropriate to their context.

What they are not, though,

is explicit.
Discrimination is also present at the perceptual
Of course discrimination in a sense is always

level.

present whenever judgment is present, for to take something
as being a such-and-such is discriminating it from that
which it is not.

But the species of discrimination

Blanshard wishes to isolate is of those ephemeral elements
which make a thing or event what it is, and can be applied
across a broad range of objects and states, e.g., space and
time.

Thus, "

. . we must admit that a child is already

using the thought of time when at a certain hour he expects
the dinner bell, when he tries to prevent the mention of
1114
bed-time, even when he cuts a corner in play.
Yet Blanshard does not suppose that the child has
14

•

p. 524.
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thought explicitly of time, or even could supply anything
What Blanshard says

like an adequate definition if asked.

about space in this context illustrates the point.

"We

think space before we think of it, and we think of it in a
matrix of irrelevancy long before we think of it pure."13
From Blanshard's examples it is clear that discrimination
is present in perceptual thought.

Indeed, such ideas are

mastered out of practical necessity.

So, once again these

ideas remain implicit; the idea time is present but not the
idea of time.
The third element, background, is related to the
transformational character of past experience on present
determination of thought.
not river-wise at birth.

A river-wise steamboat pilot is
He learns to read the river over

a period of time, perhaps reaching the point where he can
pilot the boat and muse about the adventures of boys.

If

at some time he should leave the river and set quill to
page, far from the river, to tell a tale of the adventures
of boys, he would still be river-wise.

In a very real

sense, such a steamboat pilot sees the river differently
from his passengers and indeed differently than he saw it
himself when he first began to pilot.

Further, whether on

the river or off, his fund of river wisdom is available to
him no matter what thoughts he happens to be entertaining.
Blanshard surmarizes his observations on background by
saying, "We must thus admit a third kind of perceptual
15Ibid.,
•
p. 525.
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idea, an idea that is present only in the form of a
disposition..16
Under the aegis of Blanshard's theory of thougnt,
ideas, even at the level of perceptual thought, are not
vague, indiscriminate or the results of happenstance.

His

line of argument suggests rather that they are determinate
elements of thought, guiding action and perception
consistent with their specific content.
This analysis of thought at the perceptual level is
somewhat inadequate to the question of the capacity to call
up appropriate ideas in association with specific meaning.
Inasmuch as the inquiry is directed towards "calling up"
appropriate ideas, its force is directed towards the
capacity to render some idea explicit.

What hr.s been found

on examination of Blanshard's theory of idea though, is
that appropriate ideas may be present but not explicit.

At

this juncture then, a dialectical review of the terrain
covered will prove helpful.
The independence of thought from language, the
possibility of holding an appropriate idea in awareness,
and the noncircularity of the word/idea relationship, are
the problems against which the ideational theory of meaning
is to be measured.

The first two of these issues would be

answered in a forthright manner by the theory of idea as
image.

Images exist independently of language and calling

up an appropriate image is simply a matter of forming in
16Ibid., p. 526.
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explicit consciousness the image of a dog on hearing the
term "dog."

While there is no ambiguity in this account it

is unfortunately an unworkable account.

In Blanshard's

theory of idea the hard and fast solution falls by the
wayside.

Thought exists independently of language to be

sure, but one may have an appropriate idea (a distinct idea
which functions effectively in context) and never entertain
it explicitly.

To this extent, and to this stage,

Blanshard's theory of idea has answered the second question
only in part; that is, by affirming the presence of
distinct ideas.

One of the principal differences between

Blanshard and Locke on ideas, content aside, is that under
Locke ideas have a single phase, namely the image.

For

Blanshard though, ideas have two principal phases, the
implicit and the explicit.

Accordingly then, answering the

question of whether of the capacity to call up distinct
ideas, whose presence is already affirmed, requires an
examination of the second phase of thought in Blanshard's
theory.
Thought comes into its patrimony when it is liberated
from sensation.

At this point it is able to range far from

the confines of the given, and too, it becomes explicit
thought.

The proclivity of the free idea towards language

was noted earlier; and the discussion of the capacity to
call up an appropriate idea in association with specific
meaning began with Blanshard's illustration of the word
"diffraction" initiating a process in which the idea

5?
'diffraction' is formed.

But the relation between thought

and language envisaged by Blanshard is not as simple as
this characterization might lead one to believe.

In an

examination of that relationship not only will the second
question be laid to rest, but the third, concerning the
circularity of thought and language, as well.
In his discussion of language Blanshard leaves no
doubt that thought and language mesh so well as to function
as a single fabric.

He says,

It is true that a word is commonly learned by
association with its object, and hence it may be
supposed that when we now use words in thinking, we
first form the thought of the object and this calls up
the word associated with it. But the connection is
far more intimate; the word and the definite meaning
come together, just as sensation and meaning come
together when we perceive.17
Now, Blanshard in no sense wishes to identify idea and
word, their coming together is just that--a mutual
appearance.
The mutual appearance of thought and its expression is
attributable to the means by which free ideas become fixed
in thought.

First, ". . . words do for the free idea what

sensations do for the tied idea; they give it an anchorage
in the sensible which prevents its immediately drifting
off. l8

Secondly, Blanshard says,

We have seen that in ordinary perceiving we use many
ideas, of space, time, number, and so on, which are
not as yet singled out from each other. If they are
to be converted into free ideas, this singling out
17Ibid., p. 539.
18Ibid., p. 538.
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must be achieved. . . What is important is that the
differences in the ideas, which at first we find it
hard to grasp, should correspond to plain difference
in sensation, which we find it easy to grasp."19
According to Blanshard, conflict is the midwife of the
free idea.

Specifically, the conflict is between the facts

of experience and perceptual expectations; and the facts of
experience and felt needs.

He does not characterize this

process as a sufficient cause, for of course there are many
creatures who experience the frustration of the defeat of
perceptual expectation and most will never produce a free
idea.

Yet in man such conflicts do give rise to the free

idea.

Mark Twain wrote that a cat that sits on a hot stove

lid will never sit on a hot stove lid again, but it will
never sit on a cold one again either.2°

A child though,

who is accustomed to banging on stove lids, but bangs on a
hot one one day, might in his next encounter with a stove
lid pause and consider it.

The happy times spent banging

away on the cold stove lid would be in contrast with the
hot stove lid experience.

Out of such a conflict the child

might begin to, ". . . discriminate different features to
which the rival ideas may be respectively attached." 21
Similarly, the conflict between present experience and felt
need may give rise to discrete and explicit thought.
19Ibid., p. 341.
20Mark Twain, Following the Equator (Hartford, Conn.:
The American Publishing Company, 1897) "Pudd'nhead Wilson's
New Calendar," Chap. 11.
21 Blanshard, Ibid., p. 329.
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Significantly, for purposes of this essay, the birth
of the free idea takes place in a non-linguistic matrix.
In the linguistic matrix the free idea is captured, not
created.

From the tone and details of Blanshard's argument

this conclusion is inevitable.

This is not to claim that

language cannot serve as an impetus for the deve2opment of
free ideas.

In such cases though, what the word provokes

is an examination or reevaluation of a given experience or
an already existing stock of ideas.

The word becomes, in

this sense, a verbal gesture pointing out where the
attention should be directed.

Thus, someone who has seen

before the splash of colors produced by a diamond in the
light, may look again when they hear an utterance like,
"Note the diffraction of light by this diamond."

At this

point though, one may adduce that a certain mastery of
language is already at work; one is building upon an
established foundation.
A second point significant for purposes of this study,
is that a free idea at its inception is to some degree
explicit, definite, and independent.

These are the three

principal characteristics of free ideas which serve to
distinguish them from the tied idea.

Free ideas by

definition are explicit and not restricted to what the
senses are pressing on the mind; and conversely, tied ideas
are implicit thought restricted to presently given
sensation.

The appearance of the three principal

characteristics in the free idea is an appearance of
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degree, and the development of each is to some extent
independent of the other two.

A child's idea of a flower

might be quite explicit, but might also be virtually
worthless to a botanist on account of its vagueness.
Similarly, the child might think of flowers only when
flowers are actually present, or his idea might be
sufficiently independent of sensory cues that he can think
of flowers at will.
One comment from The Nature of Thought will serve tc
secure the two aforementioned points.

Reflecting on the

experiments involving apes and their attempts to get fruit
beyond their reach, Blanshard says, "That the ape in some
cases actually does cross the line and use such ideas,"
(i.e., the free idea)
. . . is virtually oertain;1 indeed, in the case
last mentioned, if the ape, when he looked through the
bars at the stick, formed a thought of the unseen
fruit, and did not deal with it dispositionally
through the fringe of perception, as we do with a pipe
when we go for a match to light it, then he had
already taken out his first papers in the republic of
ideas. But though an ape does in moments attain to
free ideas, his hold on them is tentative and
wavering. 22
1See particularly the experiments in Ibid.,
pp. 279-82.
From this rumination the genesis and character of the
free idea as outlined is clearly intimated.

Whereas the

presence of the free idea in the mind of the ape is
22Ibid., 249. The most recent edition available
in
English of the work which Blanshard is citing is Wolfgang
Kohler, The Mentality of Apes. 2nd ed. rev., translated by
Ella Winter (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973).
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"tentative and wavering", in the mind of man the free idea
is firmly entrenched.

With the genesis and character of

the free idea in mind, as well as the role played by
language in capturing and fixing free ideas, an examination
can be made of some statements Blanshard has made from the
proper perspective.
If the mutual appearance of thought and its expression
is coupled with Blanshardis affirmation that, ". . . we do
not fully know what our idea is till we express it, and
hence that idea and expression are indivisible,"23 then the
stew really begins to boil.

Given the tortuous oath by

which the present pass has been reached, one interpretation
of the foregone statement which must be dismissed out of
hand is that man does not entertain free ideas without
expressing them; that failing the expression of a free idea
man does not comprehend it.
People are occasionally surprised by what they have
said, but they are not generally flabbergasted.

A

philosopher who sits down to write a scathing indictment of
idealism is not going to have his thought revealed to him
in the same sense that it will be a revelation to his
readers.

In Blanshard's statement a great deal of stress

must be placed on the fact that we do not fully know our
ideas until they are expressed.

Here the proper sense of

"fully" is the sense maximal explicitness.

The expression

of thought represents the upper limit of the explicitness
23Ibid., p. 540.
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of thought, though not of course the upper limit of
thought's precision. This critical difference between
explicitness and precision must be kept in mind.
A vague statement can usually be made more precise.
Take as examples:

(a) "The trash stinks" and (b) "The

trash smells like dimethylsulfoxide."

The greater

precision of statement (b) results from a more refined
characterization of the smell which prompts the use of the
word "stinks."

The method of a more and more refined

characterization is applicable to vague or ambiguous
statements in general.

Even (b) could be reformulated as

(o) "The rotten potatoes in the trash smell like
dimethylsulfoxide."

As a statement approaches ever greater

exactitude there is less and less room to question exactly
what thought is being expressed by the statement.

However,

no amount of refinement on statement (a) can render the
thought it expresses more explicit than it already is.

If

there is any room for improvements in the explicitness of
(a), it lies in the force with which it is stated.

A

person with a cold may walk into a room and utter statement
(a), or he may walk into a room in possession of the full
powers of his proboscis and utter (a).

He would be more

aware of the smell in the later case than in the former.
His thought of the smell would be more explicit.

This

change would be reflected in the first case by mumbling
statement (a).

In the second case, (a) might be forcefully

exclaimed, perhaps with the addition of a hoot and a
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wrinkled nose.

Statement (a), like any statement however

vague or precise, brings some idea to the awareness and by
so doing effects a change in the state of the idea.

The

sense then in which "we do fully know what our idea is till
we express it" is the sense in which a passage is effected
in the state of an idea by the expression of it.
The passage of an idea from tied to free may be
likened in some respects to the passage of the chrysalis
from the dark chamber of the cocoon.

When the hour draws

nigh the chrysalis emerges, no longer chrysalis, but
butterfly.

The destiny of the caterpillar is revealed in a

flutter of outstretched wings.

The progeny of the

butterfly will repeat the process, but the butterfly itself
having once attained that state is fixed forever in that
state.

Unlike the butterfly, man's ideas may inherit their

destiny as free ideas, but unless fixed there, may collapse
again into the dark cocoon of the chrysalis.

Hence, the

indivisibility of an idea and its expression results from
the fact that it is the expression which fixes the idea in
a more or less permanent state.

This is not an

indivisibility in principal nor is it an indivisibility of
identities.

No, this is an indivisibility of practice.

A

free idea, having been fixed by some expression, is calledup by that expression.
As noted earlier in reference to the question of the
capacity to call up an appropriate idea in association with
a specific meaning, the presence of an appropriate idea is
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an inevitable conclusion in Blanshard's theory of idea.

It

can now be answered whether people can call up such ideas.
The answer is yes.

But, as it turns out, one's use of

words has that particular function.

Locke was at pains to

say that while people do not always have an image in mind
when using words, i.e., explicitly present in
consciousness, such images could be called-up.

On

Blanshard's theory though, whenever a person intelligently
uses words, the idea is explicitly present and that
presence is assured by the very use of words.
Blanshard's theory of idea answers the issue of
circularity in a similar vein.

By way of illustration

consider a term such as "measurement."

The term

"measurement" helps fix and single out the idea
'measurement.'

Thus, whenever we wish to ruminate on

'measurement,' "measurement" is the vehicle which brings
the idea into awareness.

Since on Blanshard's theory an

idea is not any kind of representation, trying to form an
image of something which accompanies "measurement" is worse
than futile, for it is likely to be misleading.

What

prevents this explanation from collapsing into circularity
at this point is the specific nature of ideas which
Blanshard has put forward.
his laboratory.

Imagine a chemist at work in

He picks up a beaker, walks to a nearby

table, and pours some solution out of the beaker into a
graduated cylinder.

If he were to be interrupted in the

middle of this process and asked what he was doing, he
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might respond, "I am going to measure out 100 milliliters
of this solution."

However, if the stream of his awareness

could be examined, like some kind of mental movie, one
might only find a concern over the outcome of the
experiment.

The thought of measuring anything might be

totally absent from his immediate, explicit consciousness.
Yet, there is some sense in which the idea "measurement" is
present, guiding his actions with elegant precision.

When

called upon to think explicitly of this idea though, he
turns to "measurement" as naturally as a secretary would
turn to the index "SCIENTISTS" to find a file on Albert
Einstein.
The theory Blanshard proposes is of ideas which are
not recognizable apart from language to the imagination,
strictly speaking.

They are however recognizable to the

intellect apart from language.

The meaning of

"measurement" is the idea 'measurement,' and that idea is
measurement in posse.

The chrysalis of measurement is born

in the cocoon of the mind, and its destiny is revealed in
the stretching of a knotted cord.24
Familiarity with the image is perhaps universal and
instantly recognizable.

Familiarity with free ideas, the

24Blanshard's theory of idea has not remained unmodified
since The Nature of Thought was first published in 1940.
Inasmuch as these modifications do not significantly impact
the terms in which the present study has developed, they
have not been discussed. The interested reader is directed
to the articles, "Reply to Mr. Harris" and "Reply to Mr.
Bertocci" in Paul Arthur Schiipp, ed. The Philosophy of
Brand Blanshard, The Library of Living Philosophers,
vol. 15 (La Salle, Ill: Open Court, 1980).

61

recognition of them quite apart from the words which embody
them, is of an altogether different order.

If there is

much hope at all in such an enterprise, the quest for the
free idea, the hope lies in examining those cases in which
an idea has come to light antecedently to any term
expressing it.

Blanshard observes the difficulties

attending to the examination of free ideas by noting,
. . . we have long been using such ideas before
we begin to examine them for their own sakes, and then
they have lost their first innocence. It is even hard
to tell when a free idea has really appeared. The
distinction between free and tied ideas, like other
distinctions in mental growth, is one of degree.25
Is there anyone who, going for a drink on a dog-day
afternoon, would fill his glass to the brim and then add
f.'e,"?

Few would, simply because the addition of ice at the

end of the process would cause the precious refreshment to
overflow the glass and be wasted.

Sc one day long ago,

when the world was younger and many things were still
nameless, Archimedes had a problem.

His problem was to

measure the volume of a crown without in any way defacing
the crown.

He was sorely vexed by this problem until he

stepped into an overfilled tub.

Eureka!

An element of

experience with which he was no doubt familiar, under the
pressure of his problem, broke loose into a free idea.

An

idea, perhaps implicit in his every bathing experience, was
singled out for full and explicit attention.

He could not

shout, "Displacement!" as he ran down the street, for of
25Ibid., pp. 530-31.
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course even if he had that word, it had not as yet been
used to fix the idea which he did have.

Obviously he must

have had some words of explanation; but these could not
have been new words, and their novel arrangement in
sentences uttered fot the very first time is no different
in principle from the invention of a single term to capture
an idea newly born in the world.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSIONS

Rock solid refutations of philosophers of the caliber
engaged with in the first part of this thesis are scarcely
possible in a work of this scope.

Yet when choices are to

be made, some survey, however limited, ought to be
undertaken.

The inquiries launched into the positions of

Russell, Wittgenstein, and Morris have been all too brief,
but even this limited probing has produced results.
The position adopted by Russell is clearly problematic
when considered from the perspective of Strawson's
observations.

In ordinary language situations words and

expressions simply do not refer in the way Russell's theory
dictate they ought to.
in countless situations.

Expressions may be used in many ways
Sometimes expressions are used to

refer and sometimes not; and even in those cases in which
they are employed to mention something, there is
occasionally a failure to refer which has nothing to do
with any concealed existential claim of the expression.
Problems were also found by Chihara and Fodor in
Wittgenstein's position.

Wittgenstein believed that

skepticism was the only alternative to his claims, but this
was found not to be the case.
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Learning the meaning of

64
terms such as "gravitation" does not involve an appeal to
criteria; and neither are falling apples simply correlated,
as a contingency, with gravitation.

There is at least one

non-skeptical alternative to Wittgenstein's position,
namely theoretical inference.

Beyond this there are also

consequences of Wittgenstein's philosophy of language which
are, at best, extraordinary.

That a person may be

employing two different concepts of sleep when he says, "I
was sleeping last night, and I see him sleeping now,"
certainly runs counter to what people typically believe
about their concept of sleep.
In the final selection of alternative theories of
meaning considered, Kattsoff found several problematic
areas in the doctrines of Charles Morris.

Where the stated

objective of Morris was the elevation of semiotic to the
level of empirical science, his actual methods leave this
objective in a questionable position.

Additionally, the

special treatment of dispositions given by Morris
jeopardized either his claims tc have eliminated idea-like
entities or his capacity to analyze as signs things widely
acknowledged to be signs.

In view of these difficulties it

was concluded that Morris' theory is inadequate for the
task he has assigned it.
With these problems in mind an examination was next
undertaken of the ideational theory of meaning.

The

traditional statement of this theory as put forward by John
Locke was found tc be untenable.

Locke's theory of idea as
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image simply does not serve a theory of meaning.

Images

are too prolific and variable from person to person, and
even within a single person, to serve as that factor which
is more or less consistent in the meaning of words.
However, the ideational theory of meaning is quite distinct
from the particular theory of idea with which it is
associated.

In that spirit the ideational theory of

meaning was reevaluated in terms of the theory of idea
advocated by Brand Blanshard.
Blanshard's theory of idea was found to serve well the
ideational theory of meaning.

Three questions were asked

of his theory of idea vis a vis a theory of meaning.
three questions were answered satisfactorily.

All

The first

question asked how reasonable it was to assume the
independence of thought from language.

The second question

concerned the capacity to call up appropriate ideas in
association with specific meaning.

Finally, the third

question dealt with the possibility of the circularity of
word/idea association using Blanshard's theory of idea.
The theory of idea proposed by Blanshard has as one of its
consequences this:

appropriate, specific ideas exist

independently of language, and are clearly present and
distinguishable from any signs which are used to stand for
them.
Having said this much, the defensibility of this
version of the ideational theory of meaning remains to be
seen.

In this respect there are at least four principal

66

lines of attack:
(1)

Blanshard's theory of idea as such

(2)

Inconsistencies between his theory of idea and the

ideational theory of meaning
(3)

Flaws in the reasoning by which the three

questions earlier noted were answered, and
(4)

The theory of meaning as proposed either poorly

answers or else worsens some traditional questions
which any theory of meaning ought to answer.
For the first line of attack Blanshard's own arguments
are the best defense.

Volume one of The Nature of Thought

has been in print for some forty-eight years, and no
outright flaws have been uncovered in it.

This is a gcod

omen, but philosophers are not fortune-tellers, and of
course the present thesis cannot stand if Blanshard's
theory of idea should fall.

As for the second and third

lines of attack, they have been the principal arena in
which this thesis has worked itself out.

In this respect

this author is somewhat like a general who finds himself on
the defensive.

He makes the best preparations he can,

certainly he fills every gap he sees, but he cannot
anticipate every means of assault since the enemy is so
numerous and crafty.

As for the ultimate strength of his

position, he must wait for the results of any and all
actual assaults.
Some interesting possibilities suggest themselves
immediately concerning the fourth line of attack.

These
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possibilities will be briefly touched upon here in order to
indicate the value this version of the ideational theory
might have.

For example, a word, or something which is

taken as a word, is meaningless if it is not a sign of any
idea at all.

Pseudosigns such as these are exemplified by

the nonsense terms like "brillig," "mimsy," and "outgrabe"
which occur in Lewis Carroll's poem "Jabberwocky."

This

might be taken as a definition of formal meaninglessness.
There is also though, the possibility of a theoretical form
of meaninglessness.

That is, expressions such as "round

square" may be judged meaningless on the grounds that that
for which they are a putative mark are themselves
incoherent.

Thus, in order to be meaningful, some sensible

mark must not only stand for some idea, but the idea fcr
which it stands must also exhibit certain features; namely
that it be appropriate, distinct, be internally consistent
with itself, etc.
similar fashion.

Synonymy might be dealt with in a
Words or expressions are formally

synonymous when they are merely different marks which in
fact stand for the same ideas.

Words and expressions

would be theoretically synonymous when they are used as
such by some speaker.

For example, a person might say,

"The first branch on that tree . . . and if you look
closely at that limb . . ." in which case "branch" and
"limb" would be theoretically synonymous even though in
1 Lewis Carroll [pseud.], The Complete Illustrated
Works of Lewis Carroll (London: Chancellor Press, 1982),
p. 134.
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fact they are not formally synonymous.
But all of these hints and musings might raise more
questions than they answer, and are touched upon only to
indicate a possible response to the fourth line of attack.
They are, alas, subjects of theses in their own right.

The

present thesis, with this vision of unexplored territory on
the horizon, is now drawn to a close.
the territory covered is one in which

The prospectus for
_ere may be much

hard work yet to be done; as for the territory just
glimpsed, it has its own perils even granting that the
first part of the journey has been safely managed.

So, at

last, the end has been reached, and this thesis is now
respectfully submitted to the faculty of the Department of
Philosophy at Western Kentucky University, to the Graduate
College, and to the wider community of philosophers in
which it must find whatever place it may have.
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